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Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. 
Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co.: The 
Need for a Valid-Argument Standard of 




Sovereign Immunity is legal doctrine that exempts nations from 
being brought into foreign courts for both civil and criminal suits. The 
economies of the United States and the international community have 
become increasingly more intertwined as the trend toward 
globalization continues. This principle was statutorily enshrined when 
Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”).1 
This act codified sovereign immunity along with several exceptions to 
the doctrine that may allow jurisdiction when specific criterion have 
been met.  
The FSIA asserts that foreign states are immune from the 
jurisdiction of both federal and state courts.2 However, the 
expropriation exception allows for jurisdiction in cases where (1) 
property has been taken in violation of international law, (2) the taker 
is an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state, (3) and the 
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 1.  28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2016). 
 2.  Id.  
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commercial interest harmed directly affects the United States.3 
Therefore, the expropriation exception to the FSIA can grant 
jurisdiction if there is a claim that a property right is at issue and that 
the property right was taken in violation of international law.4 
Additionally, the taker must represent the foreign state and the 
commercial interest harmed must be one engaged in the United States.5 
Any plaintiff hoping to subject a foreign sovereign to U.S. court 
jurisdiction by means of the expropriation exception must adequately 
show the above-mentioned substantive elements. However, the 
adequate standard of review was disputed amongst American courts 
and therefore the Supreme Court sought to rule on the issue in 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling 
Co.6   
The Supreme Court correctly decided that the nonfrivolous 
standard is inconsistent with the FSIA.7 Instead, the Court declared that 
a legally valid claim is the only standard by which the expropriation 
elements should be reviewed.8 This decision furthered the historical 
goal of the FSIA by allowing the United States to circumvent disputes 
that would inexorably lead to international conflict.9 Additionally, the 
decision helped to avoid international entanglements which would 
likely lead to foreign litigation that harms American interests abroad.10 
Finally, this decision is practical because the standard proffered by the 
Supreme Court would not embroil foreign litigants in American 
lawsuits unless the wrongs alleged are indisputable.11 This standard 
forgoes the messiness of the nonfrivolous standard which is limited 
only by the ingenuity of the parties’ representation.12 Therefore, the 
Court properly decided that the standard to forgo sovereign immunity 
must be of the highest caliber to avoid international strife and to 
preserve justice.   
 
 3.  28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2016). 
 4.  Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. 
Ct. 1312, 1316 (2017). 
 5.  28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2016). 
 6.  Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 137 S. Ct.  
 7.  Id. at 1316. 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  H.R. REP. NO. 94–1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604. 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. 
Ct. 1312, 1315 (2017). 
 12.  Id. at 1316. 
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II. THE CASE 
Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co. (“parent 
company”) is based in Tulsa, Oklahoma and incorporated in 
Delaware.13 The parent company wholly owns the subsidiary 
Helmerich & Payne de Venezuela, C.A. (“subsidiary”) which is 
incorporated in Venezuela and maintains its headquarters in Anaco, 
Venezuela.14 Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co. and 
Helmerich & Payne de Venezuela, C.A. (“the plaintiffs”) are oil and 
gas drilling companies.15 The subsidiary company was certified as a 
“Foreign Company” by the Superintendent of Foreign Investment 
under the auspices of the Venezuelan Finance Ministry.16 By January 
2010, contractual agreements with the plaintiffs were routinely 
breached by the Venezuelan government culminating in a ten million 
dollar lapse in payment to the plaintiffs.17 Plaintiffs announced they 
would not seek to renew these contracts once they expired unless 
substantial effort was made by the Venezuelan government to satisfy 
their outstanding payments.18 
Representatives of the Venezuelan government, alongside the 
Venezuelan National Guard, surrounded and blockaded the drilling 
company’s property.19 The Venezuelan National Assembly declared 
the subsidiary company’s property and assets, including rigs and 
vehicles, to be matters of the public interest and subsequently 
recommended to then-President Hugo Chavez that he nationalize the 
property.20 Then-President Chavez authorized Presidential Decree No. 
7532 and officially nationalized the property.21 The plaintiffs were not 
given the opportunity to be heard by a Venezuelan court and did not 
receive compensation for the nationalized property or recompense for 
the outstanding payment.22 
The plaintiffs filed their Complaint in United States District Court 
against the Venezuelan government in September 2011, under the 
 
 13.  Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 971 F. 
Supp. 2d 49, 53 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Id.  
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. 
Ct. 1312, 1317 (2017). 
 18.  Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 784 F.3d 
804, 809 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 19.  Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 971 F. Supp. 2d at 55. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Id. at 56.  
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expropriation exception to the FSIA.23 The plaintiffs alleged their 
property was “taken in violation of international law.”24 In response, 
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the expropriation 
exception to the FSIA did not apply because the subsidiary was subject 
to the sovereignty of the Venezuelan government and a legal dispute 
emanating from there should not be reviewed by a foreign court.25 
Furthermore, the Venezuelan government argued that the parent 
company had no right to the property seized from the subsidiary.26 The 
district court dismissed the subsidiary’s claim, holding that jurisdiction 
could not be conferred because the subsidiary was a legal Venezuelan 
national and thus jurisdiction lay in Venezuelan courts.27 However, the 
district court denied Venezuela’s motion against the parent company, 
holding that the parent company did not have a right to the property.28  
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found 
that both claims (subsidiary and parent companies) fell within the 
expropriation exception to the FSIA.29 The court decided that if the 
property had been taken because of unreasonable discrimination based 
on the parent company’s nationality, then that could constitute a 
“taking in violation of international law” thereby satisfying the 
elements of the expropriation exception to the FSIA.30 Most 
importantly, the parent company’s claim met the expropriation 
requirements because the company had asserted its rights in a 
“nonfrivolous” way.31 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.32 The 
question reviewed is whether sovereign immunity can be defeated by 
making only a nonfrivolous argument within the scope of the exception 
or if a pleading necessarily shows a taking in violation of international 
law.33  
 
 23.  8 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2016). 
 24.  Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 971 F. 
Supp. 2d 49, 56 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 25.   Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 784 F.3d 
804, 808 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 26.  Id. at 811. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. 
Ct. 1312, 1318 (2017). 
 30.  Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 784 F.3d at 813.  
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 137 S. Ct. at 1318. 
 33.  Id. at 1316.  
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The History of Sovereign Immunity Pre-FISA 
American sovereign immunity jurisprudence emanates from 
British common-law tradition and sought to provide immunity for 
foreign sovereigns and representatives of the sovereign from litigation. 
Chief Justice John Marshall stated that all sovereigns assented to an 
easing of “exclusive and absolute” jurisdiction so that nations could 
benefit from one another without the risk of litigation.34  
In 1812, the Supreme Court decided Schooner Exch. v. 
McFaddon and for the first time articulated the concept of American 
sovereign immunity.35 American citizens, John McFaddon and 
William Greetham, owned a ship seized by Napoleon Bonaparte’s 
French navy while on its way to Spain.36 This ship was transformed 
into a warship.37 After a storm damaged the ship, it was forced to dock 
in Philadelphia.38 The two men filed an action in district court to 
recover their vessel.39 Eventually, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
and Chief Justice John Marshall delivered the Court’s opinion. Chief 
Justice Marshall wrote, “all sovereigns have consented to a relaxation 
in practice . . . of that absolute and complete jurisdiction within their 
respective territories which sovereignty confers.”40 Chief Justice 
Marshall shows deference to the international community stating that 
the civilized nations of the world have all reached the same conclusion 
that absolute and complete jurisdiction must be relaxed so to promote 
international business and amity.41 However, Chief Justice Marshall 
does not base his decision merely on the practice of international 
sovereigns. He acknowledges the importance of continuing 
commercial and diplomatic relations with foreign nations free of 
impediment by trivial matters, such as the seizure of a single vessel.42 
Chief Justice Marshall justifies these public policy concerns by stating 
that jurisdiction can be waived by implication, under certain 
circumstances.43 In McFaddon, the French war vessel had an implied 
waiver of jurisdiction in American territory because it was a generally 
 
 34.  Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812). 
 35.  Id. at 116.  
 36.  Id. at 117.  
 37.  Id. at 118. 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id. at 117. 
 40.  Id. at 136.  
 41.  Id. at 137–138. 
 42.  Id. at 146. 
 43.  Id.  
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held custom that maritime vessels of friendly nations be free to enter 
American docks unmolested by the threat of potential liability.44 
Additionally, Chief Justice Marshall emphasized the fact that the ship 
was a war vessel and therefore given the privileges associated with 
representation of the foreign state (as opposed to a private ship).45 
Thus, the Supreme Court unanimously found that sovereign immunity 
applied and jurisdiction over the French vessel could not be 
conferred.46   
As the concept of sovereign immunity evolved in the United 
States, abiding by international custom soon gave way to almost 
complete deference to the U.S. State Department’s policies and 
regulations.47 The 1945 case, Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, involved 
a suit from a boating accident caused by a ship allegedly owned and 
operated by the Mexican government.48 However, the government-
owned ship was in the temporary possession of a private corporation 
at the time of the incident.49 This provides an additional hurdle from 
the Schooner Exchange case because it required deciding whether the 
government or the private enterprise was culpable.50 Chief Justice 
Harlan Stone wrote in the majority opinion that when a seized foreign 
vessel claims sovereign immunity, the issue becomes “whether the 
vessel ‘was of a character and operated under conditions entitling it to 
the immunity in conformity with the principles accepted by the 
department of the government charged with the conduct of our foreign 
relations.”51 Therefore, it is clear that the Court’s position is to abide 
by the State Department’s opinion.52 This is emphasized by Chief 
Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion which stated that, only in 
cases where the State Department has not clearly established 
guidelines, should the Court analyze sovereign immunity cases within 
the constraints of regular judicial practices.53 Therefore, because the 
State Department did not have clear guidelines in this case, the Court 
followed regular judicial practices.54 In Hoffman, the Court held that 
sovereign immunity did not extend to the foreign ship and was 
 
 44.  Id. at 141. 
 45.  Id. at 143. 
 46.  Id. at 144. 
 47.  H.R. REP. 94–1487, supra note 9, at 8.  
 48.  324 U.S. 30, 31 (1945). 
 49.  Id. at 33.  
 50.  Id.  
 51.  Id. at 35.  
 52.  Id. at 38. 
 53.  Id. at 42.  
 54.  Id. at 31.  
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therefore subject to the jurisdiction of American courts.55 The decision 
turned on the fact that the Mexican government was not in possession 
of the ship during the boat accident and, thus, the ship was acting on 
behalf of private interests.56 This case stands primarily for the near 
unwavering abidance to State Department procedures.57  
Hence, in 1976, the legislature sought to statutorily enshrine what 
the judiciary and many other nations across the world have come to 
consider essential to maintaining a robust international economy 
without the detriment of adjudicating every legal dispute against a 
foreign sovereign.58 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 
codified what many courts held since the nation’s earliest days.59  
B. The FSIA and its Applications  
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) was largely an 
effort to formally end the trend of judicial deference to the State 
Department on sovereign immunity issues.60 Congress feared that the 
State Department, an exceedingly politicized institution meant to react 
to diplomatic pressure from foreign sovereigns, had become too easily 
swayed in its capacity as negotiators to be responsible for creating the 
guidelines (entirely deferred to by the courts) on a sovereign entities’ 
potential immunity.61 The FSIA sought to encapsulate the new trend in 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence known as the “restrictive” 
principle.62 The restrictive principle of sovereign immunity would end 
the era of judicial deference and bring issues of sovereign immunity 
back into the judicial sphere.63 This would allow for the de-
politicization of immunity decisions and conform to the international 
methodology for deciding such proceedings.64  
The FSIA underwent its first great test in the 1983 case, Verlinden 
B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria.65 In Verlinden B.V., a Dutch corporation 
known as Verlinden B.V. sued the Bank of Nigeria for breaching a 
 
 55.  Id. at 38. 
 56.  Id. at 33. 
 57.  Id. at 38.   
 58.  28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2016). 
 59.  H.R. REP. 94–1487, supra note 9, at 7.  
 60.  Id. at 12, 45. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 45. 
 63.  Id. at 7. 
 64.  Id. at 7, 12. 
 65.  461 U.S. 480, 491 (1983). 
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letter of credit.66 Verlinden brought suit in United States District Court 
in New York.67 The district court held that a foreign corporation could 
bring suit against a foreign sovereign in federal court.68 Despite this, 
the court dismissed the case holding that the Central Bank of Nigeria 
qualified for sovereign immunity.69 The Second Circuit held that the 
FSIA was unconstitutional as it had exceeded the scope of Article III 
of the United States Constitution.70 The Supreme Court, in a 
unanimous decision, reversed and remanded the decision for further 
proceedings in the court of appeals.71 Chief Justice Warren Burger 
wrote, “every action against a foreign sovereign necessarily involves 
application of a body of substantive federal law, and accordingly 
‘arises under’ federal law, within the meaning of Art. III.”72 Thus, the 
Supreme Court upheld the FSIA as constitutionally valid.73 
Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New 
York involved a suit brought by the City of New York against a foreign 
defendant under a “rights in immovable property” exception theory.74 
New York brought a claim against the Permanent Mission of India to 
the United Nations (“The Permanent Mission”) alleging that it had not 
paid taxes on real estate in New York.75 The Permanent Mission 
asserted a sovereign immunity defense under FSIA.76 New York 
argued the “rights in immovable property” exception to FSIA pierced 
the sovereign immunity shield.77 The Supreme Court held that New 
York’s interpretation of FSIA was correct and therefore jurisdiction 
could be conferred over The Permanent Mission by means of this 
exception.78 The American interest protected is sufficient to extend 
jurisdiction over the activity of the foreign sovereign.79 New York was 
one of the parties and the allegation directly affected the ability of New 
York to perform one of its essential duties (i.e. the collection of 
taxes).80 Therefore, whether the disputed property is located in the 
 
 66.  Id. at 482. 
 67.  Id. at 483. 
 68.  Id. at 484. 
 69.  Id.  
 70.  Id. at 485. 
 71.  Id. at 486. 
 72.  Id. at 497. 
 73.  Id.  
 74.  551 U.S. 193, 196 (2007). 
 75.  Id.  
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id. at 197.  
 78.  Id. at 202. 
 79.  Id. at 198.  
 80.  Id. 
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United States will always be a major factor in favor of extension. The 
dissent argued that tax liability is not something that Congress intended 
to “abrogate” sovereign immunity as it is insufficiently broad and 
typically aimed at delinquent taxpayers, not foreign sovereigns.81 
However, the majority contended that the American interests at issue 
overwhelm the minority’s concern.82 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l 
Drilling Co. is not the first time Venezuela had to claim sovereign 
immunity in an American court. Mezerhane v. Republica Bolivariana 
de Venezuela involved a claim by a Venezuelan citizen that his 
property had been taken in violation of international law by the 
Venezuelan government.83 The plaintiff argued the suit could be 
maintained in federal court because the expropriation exception 
applied.84 The Eleventh Circuit ruled that Mezerhane’s property had 
not been taken in violation of international law simply because 
international law is not implicated in situations involving a foreign 
plaintiff and a foreign defendant within the same country.85 Therefore, 
the Eleventh Circuit stated that it is not a valid extension of the FSIA 
to allow standing because a violation of international law is necessary 
to satisfy the expropriation exception.86 Additionally, the Eleventh 
Circuit asserted that non-extension of jurisdiction is good public policy 
because it helps the United States avoid involvement in legal scuffles 
between a sovereign and its own citizens, thereby allowing for as much 
diplomatic leeway as possible.87  
Even before the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the Venezuelan 
government’s potential sovereign immunity in Mezerhane, the Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had the opportunity to hear arguments 
for and against Venezuelan sovereign immunity.88 In DRFP L.L.C. v. 
Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela, an American company bought 
from a Panamanian company, promissory notes that were issued by the 
Venezuelan government.89 The Venezuelan government declined to 
 
 81.  Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 
193, 203 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 82.  Id. at 198. 
 83.  785 F.3d 545, 546– 47 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 84.  Id. at 548; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(3) (2016).  
 85.  Mezerhane, 785 F.3d at 551. 
 86.  Id.  
 87.  Id. at 549. 
 88.  See DRFP L.L.C. v. Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela, 622 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 
2010). 
 89.  Id. at 515. 
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pay off the promissory notes.90 Thus, the American company filed suit 
in federal court.91 The district court held that jurisdiction could be 
conferred in this case as the “commercial activities” exception applied 
thereby piercing sovereign immunity.92 A foreign sovereign satisfies 
the commercial activities exception if its conduct is (1) a commercial 
activity and (2) the commercial activity has a direct effect in the United 
States.93 The Venezuelan government conceded that payment of the 
promissory note is a commercial activity, but it contested whether the 
refusal caused a direct effect in the United States.94 The Sixth Circuit 
decided in favor of the American company, holding that a direct effect 
could be felt in the United States due to Venezuela’s forgoing of its 
fiduciary obligation.95 This decision underpins how important 
American actors and American interests can be when deciding 
sovereign immunity cases. Therefore, the extension of jurisdiction 
heavily relies on circumstances that are completely individual to each 
case, but there is usually a battle between national interest and the need 
for unencumbered diplomacy. 
C. Comparisons to Federal Question Jurisdiction 
Bell v. Hood has been interpreted to create a general rule that 
jurisdictions require only claims that are not “wholly insubstantial or 
frivolous” to survive.96 Bell involved a suit brought in federal district 
court to recover damages for violations of Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment rights.97 Respondents argued that the claims failed to state 
a cause of action from which the petitioner could feasibly recover, and 
therefore they must be defeated.98 However, Justice Black stated that 
failure to state a proper cause of action requires judgments on the 
merits, rather than dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.99 Additionally, he 
noted that “[i]f the court does later exercise its jurisdiction to determine 
that the allegations in the complaint do not state a ground for relief, 
then dismissal of the case would be on the merits, not for want of 
jurisdiction.”100 Therefore, under federal question jurisdiction a claim 
 
 90.  Id.  
 91.  Id.  
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 516.  
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. at 518. 
 96.  327 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1946). 
 97.  Id. at 679.  
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 682.  
 100.  Id. 
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that is not “wholly insubstantial or frivolous” would survive a 
jurisdictional analysis.101 
D. The International Court of Justice and Sovereign Immunity 
In Germany v. Italy, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) 
rebuked an Italian claim for compensation as a result of human rights 
violations perpetrated by the German Reich in the Second World War 
and thereby reasserted international law’s dedication to the legal 
principal of sovereign immunity.102 In 2011, Italian courts awarded 
plaintiffs damages for human rights violations committed by the 
German government during World War II.103 Germany filed a claim 
stating that their sovereign immunity was violated by Italian efforts to 
seek damages for those harmed by the Germans during the war.104 The 
ICJ accepted the case.105 Italy argued that these circumstances called 
for an exception to the typical sovereign immunity scheme due to the 
nature of the violations leading to the claims being so fundamental, or 
jus cogens, that it overrides customary international law.106 
Additionally, Italy claimed that a “territorial tort” exception, which 
would allow for a suit when a state actor commits a tort in a foreign 
territory, could be found.107 Thus, the International Court of Justice was 
tasked with examining an exception to the customary sovereign 
immunity scheme.108   
Italy’s main claim, that the conduct being violative of jus cogens 
necessitated an overriding of the typical sovereign immunity scheme, 
failed because the ICJ refused to grant such a large and ill-defined 
exception to sovereign immunity.109 The ICJ stated “there is a 
substantial body of State practice from other countries which 
demonstrates that customary international law does not treat a State’s 
entitlement to immunity as dependent upon the gravity of the act of 
which it is accused.”110 Thus, international law dictates that the gravity 
of the act is not a consideration when deciding to grant an exception to 
sovereign immunity. Additionally, the American Society of 
 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 143, ¶ 
139 (Feb. 3). 
 103.  Id. at ¶ 27. 
 104.  Id. at ¶ 15. 
 105.  Id. at ¶ 50–51.  
 106.  Id. at ¶ 80. 
 107.  Id. at ¶ 62. 
 108.  Id. at ¶ 50. 
 109.  Id. at ¶ 92–97. 
 110.  Id. at ¶ 84. 
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International Law wrote, “if the mere allegation that the State had 
committed such wrongful acts were to be sufficient to deprive the State 
of its entitlement to immunity, immunity could, in effect be negated 
simply by skillful construction of the claim.”111 Thus, the ICJ made 
clear that a potential jus cogens exception could defeat the point of 
even having sovereign immunity because the exception would allow 
weak and possibly frivolous claims to pass muster, even ones that have 
traditionally been held as squarely in the realm of conduct entitled to 
the sovereign immunity defense.112  
The ICJ decided in favor of Germany stating that all judgments 
ordering Germany to pay compensation were antithetical to the 
principle of sovereign immunity.113 The Court commenced an analysis 
of Italy’s claim that a “territorial tort exception” exists in international 
law and purports to exclude acts of state from sovereign immunity 
defenses if they have taken place in the territory of another state.114 
Under Italy’s proposed principle, the German Reich’s humanitarian 
violations committed in Italy would not have the luxury of a 
jurisdictional bar.115 The ICJ rejected this argument, stating that no 
treaties or international custom supported the notion that a “territorial 
tort” exception could be used to defeat sovereign immunity.116 The 
International Court of Justice noted that this would upend customary 
international law117 because international law normally mandates that 
actions committed by the armed forces of another nation in the course 
of armed conflict are the type awarded the luxury of the sovereign 
immunity defense.118 Thus, the ICJ easily dispensed with the 
“territorial tort” exception claim as it was unnecessary to decide 
whether such an exception exists because the type of tortious conduct 
alleged was of the kind that has consistently been held to be protected 
by sovereign immunity.119 
 
 111.  Chimène I. Keitner, Germany v. Italy: The International Court of Justice Affirms 
Principles of State Immunity, 16 ASIL INSIGHTS 5 (Feb. 14, 2012), 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/5/germany-v-italy-international-court-justice-
affirms-principles-state#_edn11. 
 112.  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 102, ¶ 92–96. 
 113.  Id. at ¶ 106–08. 
 114.  Id. at ¶ 62. 
 115.  Id. at ¶ 62. 
 116.  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), INT’L 
CRIMES DATABASE, http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/1231/Germany-v-
Italy/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2018). See also G.A. Res. 59/38, U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and Their Property (Dec. 2, 2004).  
 117.  G.A. Res. 59/38, supra note 116.   
 118.  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 102, ¶ 63. 
 119.  Id. at ¶ 77–79, 107. 
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IV. COURT’S REASONING  
In Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l 
Drilling Co., the Supreme Court unanimously held the nonfrivolous-
argument standard insufficient to review sovereign immunity 
exception claims.120 Thus, a party must have a valid claim that property 
was “property taken in violation of international law.”121 Furthermore, 
applicability of the foreign sovereign immunity defense must be 
decided “at the threshold” of the action.122 Additionally, factual 
disputes must be decided as early in the process as reasonably 
possible.123 
Initially, the Supreme Court offered a strict reading of the text to 
support its holding. Moreover, the Supreme Court marshaled support 
for its position by summoning precedent from American and 
international sources. Lastly, the Supreme Court weighed policy 
concerns in favor of a stricter standard of review.124  
A. Textual Analysis 
Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for the unanimous Court, asserted 
that a textual analysis does not support the nonfrivolous standard.125 He 
continued, noting that germane to the issue is the phrase “in which 
rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue.”126 
According to the Court, a plain view examination of the text supports 
granting jurisdiction only when the claim is ultimately valid.127 
Specifically, Justice Breyer argued that the precise language of the 
exception states a “property [right] taken in violation of international 
law,”128 and such language “would normally foresee a judicial decision 
about the jurisdiction matter.”129 Therefore, the Supreme Court 
explained that the expropriation exception demanded a determination 
as to whether a property right has been taken and if the taking violates 
international law, before determining if an exception to the FSIA is 
 
 120.  137 S. Ct. 1312, 1316 (2017).  
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. at 1324 (quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 
(1983)). 
 123. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 
1312, 1317 (2017) (quoting Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 493–94). 
 124.  See generally Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 137 S. Ct. 
 125.  Id. at 1318–19. 
 126.  Id. at 1316. 
 127.  Id. at 1318–19. 
 128.  Id. at 1316 (emphasis added). 
 129.  Id. at 1319.  
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appropriate.130  
B. Precedent: Domestic and International  
Justice Breyer offered various precedential support enlisting 
American legal history, international law and State Department 
guidance.131 In Permanent Mission of India to United Nations v. City 
of New York, the Supreme Court held the plaintiff’s claim “‘directly 
implicate[d]’ the property rights described by the FSIA exception.”132  
According to Justice Breyer, it is evident that the Supreme Court 
required more than a finding that the claim was simply nonfrivolous.133 
Moreover, it was the objective of the FSIA to reflect international 
law.134 Therefore, Justice Breyer wrote “Our courts have understood, 
as international law itself understands, foreign nation states to be 
‘independent sovereign’ entities. To grant those sovereign entities an 
immunity from suit in our courts … helps to ‘‘induc[e]’ each nation 
state, as a matter of ‘international comity.’’”135 Justice Breyer asserted 
that the FSIA’s legislative objective, to embody international law, 
supported the conclusion that the nonfrivolous standard is insufficient 
because allowing anything other than valid claims to proceed would 
necessarily violate the spirit of international law which seeks respect 
for sovereignty and to promote comity.136 Finally, Justice Breyer relied 
on the expertise of the State Department. The State Department has 
made their opinion clear reporting to Congress that they helped draft 
the FSIA “keeping in mind what we believe to be the general state of 
the law internationally, so that we conform fairly closely ... to our 
accepted international standards.”137 Justice Breyer states that the State 
Department conforms to the international law in an effort to diminish 
the likelihood of adversarial litigation.138 Therefore, it is clear that 
various and overlapping sources of precedent support the reduction of 
potentially frivolous claims by raising the FSIA review standard.  
 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id.  
 132.  Id. (citing Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 
551 U.S. 193, 201 (2007)). 
 133.  Id.  
 134.  H.R. REP. 94–1487, supra note 9, at 7. 
 135.  Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. 
Ct. 1312, 1319 (2017) (quoting Berizzi Brothers Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 575 (1926)). 
 136.  Id.  
 137.  Id. at 1320 (quoting Hearing on H.R. 3493 Before the Subcomm. on Claims and 
Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 18 (1973)).  
 138.  Id.  
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C. Policy Concerns 
Lastly, Justice Breyer noted prudential objectives would require 
a more rigorous standard.139 Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice 
Breyer stated, “the nonfrivolous-argument interpretation would 
‘affron[t]’ other nations, producing friction in our relations with those 
nations.”140 Justice Breyer clearly stated that the nonfrivolous standard 
allows for greater friction between the United States and foreign 
nations.141 It more easily embroils foreign powers in American Court 
thereby creating diplomatic animosity.142 Additionally, foreign powers 
could respond to a lesser standard by lessening their own standards and 
allowing more litigation against American interests in foreign courts.143 
This would inexorably lead to a gigantic increase in international 
litigation that is complicated, expensive and ultimately legally 
insufficient.144 According to the Court, the valid claim standard is a 
practicable solution because it decreases the amount of ultimately 
invalid claims.145 Finally, Justice Breyer asserted that it is in the 
national interest to avoid legal claims where “A sovereign’s taking or 
regulating of its own nationals’ property within its own territory” 
would ordinarily be immune from suit.146 Justice Breyer asserted that 
non-interference with the legal matters of other nations are an 
overwhelmingly prudent policy consideration that safeguards the 
concept of foreign sovereignty itself.147 Thus, according to the 
unanimous Supreme Court, such policy concerns mandate a more 
rigorous standard of review. Specifically, that the standard be a valid 
claim so as to avoid the entanglement the nonfrivolous standard 
ultimately produces.148 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the nonfrivolous 
standard is insufficient when reviewing expropriation exceptions to the 
FSIA and thus a party must have an ultimately valid claim that their 
 
 139.  Id. at 1322.  
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. at 1315.  
 142.  Id. at 1322.  
 143.  Id.  
 144.  Id.  
 145.  Id.   
 146.  Id. at 1321. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. at 1318–19.  
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property was “property taken in violation of international law.”149 
Therefore, validity determinations must be made as early as possible 
in the proceeding so that these questions may be answered before 
assessing potential applicability of the expropriation exception.150 The 
Supreme Court decided correctly in this case, determining that 
ultimately valid claims should be the only claims admissible when 
asserting the expropriation exception to the FSIA.  
The expropriation exception is an important feature of the FSIA, 
but it is best used solely when it is certain a legally redressable injustice 
occurred. The valid-argument standard is more practical than the 
nonfrivolous standard because it lessens the chance of creatively 
argued, but ultimately incorrect claims. The language of the FSIA 
supports the notion that validity should be determined before 
consideration of the expropriation exceptions.151 Additionally, 
precedent indicates the Supreme Court’s favor for a valid-argument 
standard.152 Finally, avoiding ultimately incorrect claims is essential to 
avoid international ire and allow the Executive Branch the greatest 
possible diplomatic breadth.153 It is plausible the heightened standard 
might hurt American interests and allow injustices to escape judicial 
oversight in certain individual contexts. However, the benefits of 
raising the standard outweigh such potential drawbacks. It stands to 
reason that the valid-argument standard would not dissuade 
meritorious litigation. The decision simply deters the number of claims 
that would not have ultimately passed muster anyway. Therefore, this 
unanimous decision was properly decided and stands to benefit the 
judicial system and advance the interests of the country abroad. 
A. The Textual Analysis Correctly Notes The Word “Taken” 
Explicitly Mandates Determinations That Would 
“Normally Foresee A Decision Regarding Jurisdiction”154 
The Court asserts that the language of the text requires the valid 
standard and thus logic necessitates that determinations regarding its 
validity must be made before considering jurisdiction.155 The Supreme 
Court correctly narrowed the textual debate to the phrase, a “property 
 
 149.  Id. at 1324.  
 150.  Id. at 1319.  
 151.  Id.  
 152.  Id.  
 153.  Id. at 1323.  
 154.  Id. at 1314.  
 155.  Id. at 1316.  
TRAVERS - BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2018  12:35 PM 
2018] THE NEED FOR A VALID-ARGUMENT STANDARD 329 
right taken in violation of international law.”156 Particularly, the word 
“taken” supports the idea that such a determination has already been 
made. The language of the exception surely predicates its applicability 
entirely on a valid claim. Justice Breyer wrote, “it is important to keep 
in mind that the Court of Appeals did not decide … that the plaintiffs’ 
allegations are sufficient to show their property was taken in violation 
of international law. It decided instead that the plaintiffs might have 
such a claim.”157 The difference between “might” and “are” lay at the 
heart of the review standard issue. The court of appeals decided that 
“might have such a claim” was sufficient to satisfy the language of the 
exception.158 However, that reading is illogical as “taken” clearly 
implies surety and “might” plainly does not pass muster. Therefore, 
the Supreme Court properly interpreted the language of the 
expropriation exception to mean that “taken” clearly mandates a 
judicial determination as to the validity of the claim.159 Thus, the plain 
text analysis of the statute’s language supports the valid-argument 
standard.  
B. American Court Decisions, International Law And The State 
Department Concurrently Condemn The Nonfrivolous 
Standard 
The Court correctly asserted that various sources of precedent 
explicitly and implicitly support the valid-argument standard.160 The 
Supreme Court, in Permanent Mission of India to the U.N. v. City of 
New York, extended jurisdiction because the lawsuit to enforce a tax 
lien implicated directly the property rights defined by the FSIA 
exception.”161 The majority’s assertion in Permanent Mission of India 
to the U.N. of this extension was based on more than a nonfrivolous 
claim as the claim included showings that the enforcement of a tax lien 
constitutes a property right within the scope of the FSIA.162 Therefore, 
the proper determinations discussed above were shown to be 
ultimately valid and not merely nonfrivolous. Thus, Permanent 
Mission of India to the U.N. illustrated that the Supreme Court utilized 
an ultimately valid standard.  
 
 156.  Id. at 1319 (emphasis added). 
 157.  Id. at 1318 (emphasis added). 
 158.  Id.  
 159.  Id. at 1316.  
 160.  Id. at 1319. 
 161.  Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 
193, 201 (2007). 
 162.  Id. at 202.  
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Helmerich & Payne properly argued that federal question 
jurisdiction only requires a “wholly insubstantial or frivolous claim,”163 
therefore lending credibility to the claim that the valid standard is too 
high a hurdle, but Venezuela correctly stated that such an argument 
would only suffice if Bell v. Hood created a general rule governing all 
jurisdictional questions.164 The rule in Bell v. Hood specifically refers 
to federal question jurisdiction and is not translatable to the 
expropriation exception. First, federal question jurisdiction boasts no 
substance-based prerequisites to jurisdiction as it only confers 
jurisdiction to “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States.”165 However, the expropriation exception 
is itself a substance-based prerequisite as it requires certain substantive 
conclusions to be drawn.166 Additionally, the intent of the statutes was 
different and thus the two are not comparable.167 Federal question is 
meant to decide jurisdictional dispute between federal and state 
court.168 While the FSIA determines if a foreign state may be sued in 
any court.169 Lastly, Helmerich & Payne argues that the “wholly 
insubstantial and frivolous” claim bar articulated in Bell v. Hood has 
been used to evaluate jurisdictional claims beyond merely federal 
question jurisdiction issues and has been applied with regard to many 
statutes that differ in policy, text and purpose.170 Venezuela maintains 
that despite the standard being used in other context, this does not mean 
that the standard has become a general rule that must be applied to all 
jurisdictional questions and that the difference in purpose is too great 
to make them comparable.171 Additionally, the US filed an amicus brief 
arguing that the FSIA expropriation exception implicates substantive 
federal law, in addition to procedural federal law, and it should not be 
subject to the “exceptionally low” bar reserved for pure jurisdiction 
questions.172 Therefore, the Bell v. Hood rule is not applicable in the 
 
 163.  Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. 
Ct. 1312, 1318 (2017). 
 164.  Brigit Kurtz, What Is the Pleading Standard for Claims Against Foreign Sovereigns 
Based on Takings in Violation of International Law?, 44 ABA SUPREME COURT PREVIEW 60, 
62 (2016). 
 165.  28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
 166.  8 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2016). 
 167.  Kurtz, supra note 164, at 62. 
 168.  28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).  
 169.  28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2016).  
 170.  Kurtz, supra note 164, at 62.  
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 22–23, Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 1312 (2017) (No. 
15-423).  
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sovereign immunity context. 
The Supreme Court correctly asserted that the FSIA sought to 
reflect the tenants of international law and because respect for 
independent sovereignties and promotion of international comity are 
objectives of international law;173 such objectives are satisfied by a 
higher standard of scrutiny that allows circumvention of the pitfalls 
invited by invalid claims. Congress declared, “[f]irst, the bill would 
codify the so-called ‘restrictive’ principle of sovereign immunity, as 
presently recognized in international law.”174 The Court agrees, 
believing that past judicial decisions also offer support for adherence 
to international law.175 Thus, to uphold the pillar objectives of 
international law (i.e. independence and comity), allowing solely valid 
claims to survive judicial scrutiny bolsters such aims. Sovereign 
independence is strengthened by a higher standard because it would 
reduce litigation and therefore potential international conflicts. The 
nonfrivolous standard allows blurring of the legal fault lines between 
nations. International comity is directly affected by this blurring 
because international relationships are inevitably strained by creatively 
argued, but ultimately invalid litigation allowed by the lesser standard. 
Although even valid claims could offend these pillars, they are 
worthwhile pursuits because of the compelling nature of a valid 
injustice. Thus, international law undoubtedly prefers the valid-
argument standard.  
The Supreme Court’s decision to heighten the review standard 
comes several years after the ICJ refused to allow two suggested 
exceptions to the customary international sovereign immunity 
doctrine.176 Therefore, the state of international law (exemplified by 
Germany v. Italy) tends to support the Court’s decision to reaffirm the 
basic tenants of sovereign immunity by raising the standard of review 
for expropriation exception because the case shows the international 
community’s dedication to the concept of strong sovereign immunity 
shields. The ICJ disfavored Italy’s assertion that sovereign immunity 
is not to be extended when the conduct was of a jus cogens nature or 
in circumstances where a tort was committed by armed forces during 
a war in another sovereignty (or a territorial tort exception).177 The ICJ 
stated that a jus cogens exception would not be necessary as it does not 
 
 173.  Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. 
Ct. 1312, 1319 (2017). 
 174.  H.R. REP. 94–1487, supra note 9, at 7. 
 175.  See Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. at 136–137; see also Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 493. 
 176.  See generally Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 102. 
 177.  Id. 
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conflict with sovereign immunity, thus not requiring an exception. 
Additionally, the proper framework for the problems with past German 
aggression is through the reparations system and not to undermine their 
sovereign immunity.178 Lastly, the ICJ knows that to allow Italy’s new 
exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity would be to open the 
flood gates allowing claims to bypass immunity for simply showing 
the state had performed some sort of wrongdoing.179  The ICJ believes 
that this would undermine the concept of sovereignty immunity 
because any claim could feasibly construct a narrative that would 
adequately show improper behavior on the part of the state.180 The 
broadness of either of these exceptions would weaken the fundamental 
concept of sovereign immunity and overly entrench nations in 
litigation and counter litigation.  
The Supreme Court’s decision comports with the principles of the 
ICJ’s decision because both can be characterized as a defense of 
customary international law’s core concept of sovereign immunity.181 
Both discourage entirely frivolous and substantively weak claims from 
penetrating the shield of sovereign immunity.182 Lastly, they both 
reaffirm the importance of sovereign equality and the traditional 
aversion to allowing nations to be tried in foreign courts.183 Thus, the 
current state of international law on sovereign immunity has been to 
reaffirm its value on the world stage and to disfavor attempts to 
broaden exceptions to the doctrine. 
Lastly, the Supreme Court marshals support given to the valid-
argument standard by the State Department and properly employs its 
expertise to support their decision.184 The State Department made no 
secret of their support for the FSIA and the objectives of international 
law.185 Specifically, the State Department has been vocal as to the 
benefits of a higher standard of review declaring that it would diminish 
the likelihood of foreign nations subjecting Americans to a 
nonfrivolous standard.186 Therefore, State Department policy 
 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. at ¶ 46.  
 180.  Id.  
 181.  See generally id.; see also Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne 
Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 1312, 1318 (2017). 
 182.  See generally Jurisdiction Immunities of the State, supra note 102; see also 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 137 S. Ct. at 1320. 
 183.  See generally Jurisdiction Immunities of the State, supra note 102; see also 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 137 S. Ct. at 1320. 
 184.  Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 137 S. Ct. at 1320. 
 185.  Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 690–91 (2004). 
 186.  Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 137 S. Ct. at 1320–21. 
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objectives lay concurrent with a higher standard of review.       
C. The Overwhelming Interest in Good Policy      
The unanimous Court persuasively argues the merits of a higher 
standard of review as it discourages other nations from lowering 
immunity exception standards, avoids friction with foreign 
sovereignties and allows for the greatest latitude possible for the 
Executive to negotiate unencumbered by the strain of entangling 
litigation as per their constitutional vocation.187 Justice Breyer invokes 
Nat’l City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, which specifically 
states that reciprocal self-interest is a major consideration when such a 
decision would result in counter-litigation by another sovereignty.188 
The Court states the inevitable outcome of the nonfrivolous standard 
is the increase in exceptions to sovereign immunity levied against 
American interest.189 To avoid such an outcome, the standard must be 
heightened so the United States position is concurrent with the 
international view and thus would not incite counter-action by foreign 
powers. Additionally, Justice Breyer notes that the nonfrivolous 
standard affronts other nations by allowing legally insufficient claims 
to be adjudicated in American courts.190 Clearly, it is in the best interest 
of the United States to avoid complicated litigation involving foreign 
entities that could potentially produce ill-will especially if the claim is 
shown invalid. If friction is required in the interest of justice, then 
perhaps the interest is so compelling as to withstand the friction. 
However, the nonfrivolous standard is untenable because it will 
inevitably cause friction between the United States and a foreign power 
for an ultimately unviable claim. Lastly, the nature of an ever-
globalizing world compels the judiciary to consider the consequences 
of allowing the nonfrivolous standard to interfere with the executive’s 
constitutional directive to conduct foreign policy. It is in the best 
interest of the United States that the Executive be able to negotiate 
unfettered by stress resulting from such an unpredictable standard. 
Furthermore, interference with the Executive is not an advisable 
inclination for the judiciary.  Hence, the nonfrivolous standard should 
make way for the valid-argument standard because it is a more 
practicable solution to policy concerns. 
 
 187.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 188.  348 U.S. 356, 362 (1955); see also Schooner Exch., 11 U.S.  
 189.  Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. 
Ct. 1312, 1322 (2017). 
 190.  Id.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co. is noteworthy 
because amplifying the expropriation review standard will limit the 
number of cases allowed in American courts to solely those that can 
show valid determinations that such an exception would suffice.191 
Thus, it will be much more difficult to maintain lawsuits against 
foreign governments because the FSIA immunity will presumably 
apply unless the valid-argument standard is met (and not if it is just 
possibly met).192 Justice Breyer, writing for the unanimous Court, was 
highly influenced by text and precedent, but the policy concerns were 
most persuasive. The possibility of increased diplomatic friction, 
counter-litigation and potentially handcuffing the ability of the 
executive branch to perform their constitutionally delegated power to 
negotiate with foreign sovereignties is not practicable given the 
context of an ever-globalizing world. Helmerich was correctly decided 
because the Supreme Court recognized the potential dysfunction that a 
lower standard would subject diplomacy and the judiciary to. The 
strength of their reasoning cannot be denied as the higher standard 
merely requires that a claim against a foreign sovereignty be valid. The 
context of how serious and complicated international litigation 
provides justification for the highest standard so claims that are legally 
insufficient get barred from United States Courts and will not pose a 
problem for our relationship’s abroad. 
 
 
 191.  Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 137 S. Ct.  
 192.  Id. at 1320. 
